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Article 11

Christianity Views Fetal Research
James J. Quinn, S.J.

Father Quinn is an associate professor of philosophy at the
Creighton University School of Medicine in Omaha. He teaches theology and philosophy.
It is no longer an easy matter for Christians to have unified solutions to moral problems created by medical science. Disunity is caused
sometimes by the lack of data surrounding a new medical procedure,
but most of the time disagreement comes from the vast resources of
Christian revelation which offer numerous approaches to the solution
of moral problems. In our present day, the science of theology is
advancing rapidly, and is responsible for exposing a diversity of starting points or approaches to solving moral problems.
This article explores four different opinions in one specific area of
Christian disunity - nontherapeutic (clinical) fetal research. (Nontherapeutic research is used to bring benefits to future generations and not
directly to the volunteer.) In giving moral opinions about the use of
fetuses in this type of research, Christians have offered more than
four. But as a background for proposing another view, the four selected for analysis are sufficient. Professors Fletcher's and Ramsey's
proposals must be considered first because they present opposing conclusions which set the polar limits of Christian disunity.
Prof. Joseph Fletcher, teacher of medical ethics at the University of Virginia School of Medicine, maintains that any legitimate
research on a fetus to be aborted is justified because it has no rights
and belongs to no one. 1 Prof. Paul Ramsey of Princeton University
has charted a way exactly opposite. He claims that to make any nontherapeutic research just, consent must be obtained. He finds that no
one can justly assume the role of proxy, and that the fetus is unable to
give consent. Hence, fetal research is unjust. 2
Lying somewhere in between these contraries are other answers.
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Leroy Walters, both associated with
Kennedy Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics at Georgetown University, veered toward center when they
expressed their Catholic views in a recent article:
"In our opinion, nonthe rapeutic research that entails 'no discernible risk' or
'minimal risks ' is morally permissible in the case of children. This view is based
on the general notion that all members of a society owe certain minimal debts
to that society, among them the duty to take part in relatively safe biomedical
research projects . .. this position can without difficulty be applied to fetuses
whose parents intend to bear responsibility for th e case of children·to-be-born."
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Here, both are talking about fetuses which are to be born. But to give
guidance to those who believe in a mother's right to have an abortion,
they offer this principle to protect the fetus to-be-aborted during
research:
"In cases involving abortion ... only research procedures which would be per·
mitted by future parents should be allowed."3

Recently another "in-between" opinion, which is not Christian in
origin, but which some Christians adopt appeared in the Federal
Register. 4 It is very similar to the one above in content, but it is
bound to have a much greater impact on future fetal research. It was
drawn up by "The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research," which submitted a
number of recommendations and guidelines to Caspar W. Weinberger,
former secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare . 5 He appointed this commission last year to study the public
policies concerning research on fetuses, pregnant women, and in vitro
fertilization. The Commission's draft indicated which fetal research
projects were acceptable and which were not. The Secretary accepted
the draft July 29, 1975, and made most of it regulatory for all DHEW
grants, August 8,1975.
Surprise After Shock
It is a pleasant surprise to read them. After the terrible shock we
received when the Supreme Court informed us, January 22, 1973, that
our forefathers who wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights gave
no rights to non-viable fetuses, it is surprising to see a government
body show some concern for them. It is also pleasant -like breathing
fresh air after working all day in urban smog - to see the sensitivity
with which fetal life is protected.
In the formation of the majority of regulations, the Commission
used four humane principles which did much to retain the traditional
dignity of incipient life: 1) no research should expose the fetus to any
risks of life or health unless they are minimal; 2) the fetus should not
be deprived of the right to give consent, which can be done by proxy
through the mother; 3) it is prohibitive to do fetal experimentation if
the knowledge can be obtained other ways, such as through "investigation on pertinent animal models and non-pregnant humans (when
appropriate);" and 4) all fetuses are to be treated equally without
discrimination. From these principles, a number of recommendations
were formed which gave status and protection to the fetus.
For instance, in their concern for fetal human life no money for
research would be granted unless the form, to which the mother must
consent, had proper monitoring and the project passed the scrutiny of
a review board. Also, when the Commission considered "non therapeutic research directed toward the fetus during the abortion pro-
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cedure and nontherapeutic research directed towards the non-viable
fetus ex utero," it required that the fetus must have gestated less than
20 weeks, and nothing must be done which would alter the duration
of the life of the fetus.
So far, four different views have been presented: Fletcher's, Ramsey's, the Commission's, and McCormick's and Walter's. If anyone is
interested in studying a fuller spectrum of Christian opinions, he may
wish to examine the summary reports which the Commission noted in
its minutes during a period when it invited thirty-five witnesses to
testify - philosophers, theologians, social workers, physicians, organization spokesmen, lawyers, public officials, and students, (many of
them speaking from a Christian background).6 The majority agreed
substantially with at least one of the four opinions already discussed,
but they did have a number of minor differences. The minutes indicate
that the Commission depended a great deal upon these testimonies in
the final draft of their recommendations. 7
In the process of approaching a unified Christian stand on what is
right and what is wrong in clinical fetal research, many divergent views
must be eliminated by showing that even though they may be Christian in some aspects, they are not representative of Christian teaching
in all aspects. To some extent the four opinions explained above can
be eliminated because each one has omitted some part of Christian
revelation. This last statement will be clarified in the following comments about each one's argument.
Many Christian philosophers and theologians accept Fletcher's
observation that what characterizes a "person" is his awareness of
social and legal rights and responsibilities. They part company with
him, however, when he insists that rights are consequential to this
awareness. Fletcher believes that personhood comes into existence
some years after birth and can depart long before a person dies; only
during this time do rights exist. To put it another way, only when the
human being can respond in a meaningful way is he a person; thus,
fetuses, young children, the senile, and those in irreversible coma have
no rights. That such human beings have a vital source within them
which is the origin of rights seems to have no reality for the Professor,
but it does for Christians who believe from revelation that God creates
something which makes the human being a person and dignifies him
with rights.
Necessary Digression
A slight digression is necessary to clarify the distinction now being
made between "person" and "human being." Not so long ago everybody agreed that any human being was a person. For Christians, the
theological definition of "human being" applied equally to "person."
Many Christians still use the terms interchangeably, and are surprised
February, 1978

57

to see others making distinctions. Today, "human being" is often used
as a scientific term to identify something that comes from human
parents, with the same chromosomal makeup and genetic code, whose
embryonic development, anatomic structure, and physiological functions are similar to a being classified as homo sapiens. "Person" is
reserved to identify a human being who has rights. This distinction
became more widely used sometime after the Supreme Court declared
that a fetus had no constitutional rights until it was viable.
Back again to Fletcher's view. It must be admitted that he is no
different from many other Christians in declaring a time when a
human being becomes a person. Proponents can be found for almost
every stage of the development continuum - conceptus, blastocyst,
embryo, fetus, neonate, infant, child, and teenager. To arrive at a
"time" theory, Fletcher and these proponents set down a criterion for
the emergence of personhood from sciences such as embryology,
psychology, anatomy, sociology, etc.
The question is asked: Which science offers the most accurate starting point for personhood? No one can answer it, and thus none of the
theories are any help in giving guidance in a practical situation where
one has to decide the moral issue: Are any rights being violated in this
proposed project of fetal research? Since none of the theories is certain, there is only one way for a Christian to decide - take the safe
course by acting on the presumption that the conceptus has rights. If
judgments are made with respect for the presumed personal rights of
the conceptus, then no rights will be violated. To say, for example,
that the fetus to be aborted is usable in research because it is not
wanted and has no rights, is to take a risk that rights will be violated.
This is Fletcher's stand. In no way can a Christian accept this position.
Next, Christians gladly accept the DREW regulations and guidelines
in as much as they are expressions of moral concern which the American people have in response to those pediatricians and embryologists
who feel that no regulations should impede fetal research. But that
does not necessarily mean that they accept them as their own personal
moral views.
Those pediatricians and embryologists who advocate that no regulations restrict nontherapeutic fetal research claim that "The research is
necessary to help future generations. We must be allowed to do it,
unhampered, for the public good." In the light of this "great need"
for society, the moral issues involved are forgotten. But a Christian
cannot forget them; human life is present and human rights need to be
considered.
The DREW regulations defend human life, but the source of these
restrictions comes from public policy, which is the raison d 'etre for
laws and court jUdgments. Public policy, though it might help in guiding a ' Christian's conscience to do the right thing, is not the sole
source, and sometimes no source at all. Each Christian should make up
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his conscience according to revealed truths and philosophy. Maybe
these regulations express moral judgments that Christians accept, but
there is no built-in guarantee that they will because the source from
whence they came is not Christian.
McCormick and Walters arrive at a solution for the use of fetuses in
clinical research in a typically Christian way, but in doing so they
seem to ignore certain aspects of Christian revelation. This can be seen
in two of their principles: 1) "All members of a society owe certain
minimal debts to that society, among them the duty to take part in
relatively safe biomedical research projects" - from this they concluded that parents, willing to take the responsibility, can consent to
have their children-to-be-born be subjects in fetal research as long as
the risks are minimal or non-discernible; 2) the other principle concerns fetal research which involves abortion cases: "Only procedures
which would be permitted by future parents should be allowed."
Impracticality of Principles
The impracticality of these two principles has been pointed out by
Ramsey,8 who claimed that in order to apply the first principle, two
questions have to be answered, but neither one can be: What is an
acceptable definition of "minimal risks?" and, who is the qualified
judge to declare that a risk is minimal?
Their second principle might need some word revision because it
seems to sanction unjust abortions. Mothers who are about to have
abortions and are asked to consent to fetal testing are advised to
follow the example of "future parents" who permit their fetuses to be
used in clinical research. Now it is possible that "procedures which
would be permitted by future parents" could be unjust. It is certain
that McCormick and Walters do not support this possibility.
But no matter how it is worded, it will not be applicable at certain
times for mothers about to have an abortion. Think of the research
projects which are designed only for fetuses about-to-be aborted. Here
no model exists to give guidance. Some other principle is necessary to
help these mothers protect their fetuses.
Granted that the practical problems could be solved, there remain a
couple of knotty questions for Christians: What is the nature of this
duty which a fetus has, that is, is it a duty in justice or charity? Where
in philosophy or theology do McCormick and Walters find this duty
expressed?
There is real doubt that McCormick and Walters relied upon any
personally acceptable philosophy to establish that a fetus has a duty in
justice to participate in research. Two systems, natural law philosophy
and Kantian deontology, have presented the most favorable theories
to establish this kind of duty, yet it does not seem to be found in
either of them.
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Natural law philosophy makes man responsible because of the law
of his very nature, but it does not demand that any duty be discharged
until it is clearly known. Since the fetus can never know the existence
of this duty, natural law philosophy positively states that the fetus is
not bound in justice to discharge it.
Kantian deontology, which defends duty for its own sake, maintains that duty is recognized as duty only by a person who is able to
perceive moral situations; duty cannot exist in a non-reasoning human
being. It must be said that fetal obligations never could become a part
of Kantian philosophy.
There are other philosophical theories that they could use to
tiemonstrate fetal duty, but all of them have the fatal flaw that their
arguments contain non-Christian aspects. For instance, utilitarianism
which says that man achieves his goal when his actions give the most
happiness to the most people, does approve of certain types of fetal
research. The flaw shows in the altruistic goals set up by John Stuart
Mill and G. E. Moore, two proponents of this philosophy. In this
system, man's goal for existing is ultimately reduced to a means - he
serves the common good. This means that fetuses should be used in
research when they can further the common good. McCormick and
Walters would reject this philosophy for Christian reasons. Christ
taught that man's final goal is not in this life. He does not exist for the
state or for the common good. His goal is self-perfection which is
achieved in part by charitable actions toward his fellow men and
comes to fulfillment in the next life.
Let it be granted that McCormick and Walters did not use philosophy as their source for claiming fetal duty in justice. This can be done
with some bravado because there are still other avenues to examine.
Did they find fetal duty "in justice" expressed in revelation? A brief
answer that might have to face a barrage of objections can be given:
God's revealed truth does not condemn fetal research, but one looks
in vain for any direct or indirect statement indicating any type of fetal
obligation.
It seems clear that McCormick and Walters could not look upon this
fetal duty as an obligation in justice. There is no foundation for such a
judgment. But there are heavy indications that within the Christian
law of charity they have found it. If this is true, then they would
claim that a fetus is bound by charity to partake in noteworthy research projects when the data sought can only be supplied by fetal
testing.
Duty's Existence Denied
Upon closer examination it seems that the existence of such a duty
must be denied even though the fetus undergoes no discernible risk.
Medical research has not advanced enough for anyone to claim with
certainty that this or that research project will produce benefits for
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future generations or to prove that the benefits are truly noteworthy.
When duties are doubtful, they do not exist.
It must be concluded that the fetus has no obligation in justice or in
charity to partake in clinical fetal research. However, it has been suggested that the fetus could be presumed to volunteer. Such a suggestion, if acted upon, would really dehumanize the fetus. The Christian
volunteer receives nobility and merit because he intends to help his
fellowmen out of a motive of charity based upon supernatural faith.
No merit can come to the fetus, and it is robbed of any nobility - its
participation is without love and faith.
Finally, Ramsey's conclusion, the fourth and last to be examined,
comes closest to a true moral decision for a Christian. Bluntly stated,
he believes no clinical fetal research is justified, because no person can
rightfully and responsibly give proxy consent. But maybe he goes too
far in rejecting, for all time, any nontherapeutic fetal research. The
Christian's view is not that closed. There may be some room, but at
the present time it is hard to see what sort of project might rightfully
open the door.
The Christian describes a "human being" as one created by God
over whom he has a special providence that will enable him to bring
God's goodness and love to many in his lifetime and to receive God's
gifts through others. This creature, made to God's own likeness, is
destined to become a son of God and inherit heaven. Christians believe
that there is nothing God wants more highly respected in the universe
than man.
For instance, what mother who looks upon her unborn child as the
supreme creation of God can easily give proxy consent for fetal nontherapeutic experimentation? Most of them would consider the use of
their children for the gathering of scientific data repulsive. Benefits for
future generations are so vague and the possibility that they will come,
so unsure, that mothers cannot be psychologically persuaded by any
sense of obligation to give proxy consent, and no one should expect
this type of mother to give it.
Also, what Christian bio-researcher believing that his work takes on
greatness when it is directed to helping God's favorite creatures, will
find it easy to assure himself that non therapeutic fetal research is
nobler than the traditional respect paid to fetal life? His instincts warn
him that such research treads on sacred waters, and the outcome could
be sacrilegious.
Again, what Christian member of an ethics board who believes in
the God-given dignity of human life will look upon any proposal for
non therapeutic fetal research as totally acceptable? For him, fetal
research has not developed enough prestige to allow him to decide
that even the best proposal has more merit than the good achieved by
maintaining the traditional high respect for human life.
Notice, in each one of these cases there is a reluctance to approve
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any nontherapeutic fetal research. However, none of them closes the
door completely. What is happening is a weighing out of values - the
good that comes from respecting human life in contrast to the benefits
to humanity coming from fetal research. It is possible that benefits to
future generations will become a greater Christian value, but today .
Christian judgment says, "So far it has not happened." If this is the
direction Christian morality could eventually take, then Ramsey's
absolute prohibition of fetal research cannot be called Christian.
A summary of the points made in this Christian view is: 1) personal
rights are inviolable - they come from within, as opposed to being
acquired; 2) the fetus must be presumed to possess personal rights any
time the question of its use in clinical research is being decided;
3) Christians may use public policy to make moral jUdgments, but
never exclusively ; they always tum to reason and revelation to help
them form their consciences; 4) fetuses do not have a duty in justice
or charity to partake in clinical research; to presume they can volunteer would bE: to acknowledge they can be used as means to an end;
5) Christians should not close the door on the possibility of fetal
research.
This analysis has come to an end, but dialogue about the morality
of nontherapeutic fetal research has not. The position expressed here
touches basic Christian thought, but it is not meant to be the final
word. More study on everybody's part must continue in order to bring
Christian unity out of revelation. At present, the Christian way to
benefit future generations will come from intensified therapeutic research, where the living fetus and future fetuses still receive supreme
consideration among God's creatures.
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For clergy and professed Brothers. 12 days - strictly anonymous.
Maximum of eight participants.
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or their representatives. 2 days.
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In one's own life (Retreats) or others' (Workshops).
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Rev. John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S., Renewal, Rest and Re-Creation,
P.O. Box 3238, Alexandria, Virginia 22302.
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